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The Politics of Selecting Chevron Deference
Kent Barnett, Chistina L. Boyd, and Christapherf Walker*

In this article, we examine an important threshold question in judicial behavior and
administrative law: When do federal circuit courts decide to use the Chevron deference
framework and when do they select a framework that is less deferential to the administrative agency's statutory interpretation? The question is important because the purpose of
Chevron deference is to give agencies-not judges-policy-making space within statutory
interpretation. We expect, nonetheless, that whether to invoke the Chevron framework is
largely driven by political dynamics, with judges adopting a less deferential standard when
their political preferences do not align with the agency's decision. To provide insight, we
analyze circuit court decisions from 2003 until 2013 that review agency statutory interpretations. Our results-from the largest and most comprehensive database of its kindprovide partial confirmation of our expectations. When courts reviewed liberal agency
interpretations, all panels-liberal, moderate, and conservative-were equally likely to
apply Chevron. However, when reviewing conservative agency interpretations, liberal panels
selected the Chevron deference framework significantly less frequently than conservative
panels. Contrary to limited prior studies, we find no evidence of "whistleblower" or
disciplining effects when judges of different judicial ideologies comprised the panel.
Viewed together, our results provide important implications for the current debate on
whether to eliminate, narrow, or clarify Chevron's domain.

1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a growing call in Congress, in the legal academy, and on

the federal bench-largely from those right of center-to eliminate longstanding judicial
deference doctrines to federal agency interpretations of law. Legislation has been introduced to amend the Administrative Procedure Act to require courts to review de novo all
agency interpretations of statutes and regulations. More recently, the president nominated, and the Senate confirmed, a jurist to the Supreme Court-Neil Gorsuch-who as
a circuit judge expressly called into question the constitutionality and wisdom of Chevron
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deference to agency statutory interpretations. Gorsuch's doubts about Chevron deference
were front and center at his confirmation hearing,
For more than three decades, Chevron deference has commanded courts to defer
to a federal agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that the agency
administers (Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc. 1984). Courts usually do so
under a two-step framework. Under Chevron's first step, the court asks whether the statutory provision at issue is unambiguous. If so, the inquiry ends, and the court enforces the
unambiguous meaning. If the provision is ambiguous, the court proceeds to Chevron's
second step and asks whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable. If it is, the
agency's interpretation prevails, even if the court believes that the agency's interpretative
is not the best interpretation. As opposed to many other standards of review, the Chevron
framework limits judicial interpretive primacy and seeks to separate judges from their
policy preferences.
Over the years, Chevron deference has been subject to extensive debate and discussion. Westlaw reports that the Supreme Court's Chevron decision has been cited in more
than 80,000 documents in its database, including more than 15,000 cases and nearly
18,000 law review articles and other secondary sources. Indeed, no other administrative
law decision by the Supreme Court has received as many citations in the academic literature (Shane & Walker 2014:475).
Hundreds of legal scholars, including empiricists, have addressed Chevron's theoretical foundations, its legal and constitutional status, and its doctrinal scope. A number of
empirical scholars have examined Chevron and case outcomes, either through important
descriptive accounts of how Supreme Court and circuit court cases use Chevron
(Eskridge & Baer 2008; Barnett & Walker 2017a; Pierce 2011; Schuck & Elliot 1990; Merrill 1992; Kerr 1998) or through more systematic empirical examinations of the political
dynamics of judicial decision making in these courts in light of Chevron (Cross & Tiller
1998; Czarnezki 2008; Miles & Sunstein 2006; Sunstein et al. 2004). Among other significant insights, this empirical literature reveals that where judges' partisanship aligned with
the direction of the agency outcome, those judges were more likely to affirm the agency's
interpretation.
Despite the mountain of Chevron-related scholarship, we continue to have little concrete evidence on when and why judges choose to apply the Chevron framework versus
applying some less deferential standard. The judicial choice of whether to apply the Chevron doctrine or some less deferential standard is an important threshold question worthy
of additional attention.
First, the choice of the review standard-Chevron or otherwise-lays the path
toward the outcome in the case. Standards that demand a high degree of deference to
the initial decisions should lead to higher rates of affirmance of those decisions than
standards that give judges more discretion to insert their own preferences. The Chevron
doctrine, when faithfully applied, unquestionably cabins judicial discretion and demands
a high degree of adherence to agency statutory interpretation decisions. As a result,
judges may look to apply less deferential standards of review during times when they are
likely to disagree with the agency. A standard like the Skidmore v. Swift (1944) doctrine,
for example, permits judges not to defer to the agency's interpretation if that
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interpretation is not persuasive. This less deferential standard undoubtedly eases a
judge's path toward overturning the agency interpretation and, as such, is critical to
study. And, of course, plenary or de novo review shifts interpretive power even further
toward courts and away from federal agencies. As Tribe once argued, "[j]udicial authority
to determine when to defer to others ... is a procedural form of substantive power"
(1978:iv).
Second, and more generally, studying threshold questions in judicial behavior is
critical for developing a broader understanding of judicial behavior. Epstein and Knight
argue that empirical explorations of judging "should not begin and end with examinations of the vote, as they have for so many years. Rather, we must explore the range of
choices that contribute to the development of law" (1998:185). Although a handful of
empirical studies have tackled important threshold questions-for example, those related
to standing (e.g., Staudt 2004; Pierce 1999; Rowland & Todd 1991), standards of review
in constitutional law cases (e.g., Baldez et al. 2006), and certiorari at the Supreme Court
(e.g., Black & Owens 2009; Caldeira & Wright 1988)-most empirical work continues to
focus on the outcomes and merits. Studying the choice to apply or avoid Chevron promises not only to provide substantive insight into judicial review in administrative law cases
but also the iterative and agenda-setting nature of judicial behavior.
To provide the first systematic empirical evaluation of this threshold Chevron question, we use the Barnett and Walker (2017a) data to analyze published circuit court decisions from 2003 through 2013 reviewing agency statutory interpretations. Our results
confirm longstanding intuition and earlier, more limited empirical studies: judges do not
consistently apply Chevron. Our findings offer some surprising insights into Chevron's
political dynamics. When courts review liberal agency interpretations, all panels-liberal,
moderate, and conservative-are nearly equally likely to apply Chevron, as opposed to
some lesser deference standard or no deference at all, but when reviewing conservative
interpretations, liberal panels apply Chevron significantly less frequently than conservative
panels. Contrary to some prior work examining outcomes and utilizing smaller datasets,
we find no evidence of "whistleblower" or disciplining effects when judges of different
judicial ideologies comprised the panel.
As we detail further in the discussion section, our findings have important implications. Which judges are and are not consistently applying the Chevron framework may
be our most intriguing findings. Despite growing Republican skepticism of Chevron,'
our results reveal that liberal judges are the ones who are less likely to invoke Chevron
deference 2 than their conservative colleagues, at least with respect to conservative
agency statutory interpretations. This finding likely means that notable prior empirical
studies reporting that judges' political preferences drive case outcomes when utilizing
the Chevron doctrine underreport the political dynamics at play in this arena. Our

'Walker (2018) provides a review of the judicial and scholarly criticism of Chevron to date.
2

Throughout this article, we use a variety of verbs-for example, invoke, choose, select, apply-to refer to the

threshold, premerits decision of circuit courts to utilize the Chevron deference framework to review an agency's
statutory interpretation instead of some less deferential standard.
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results also provide critical empirical insights into Chevron's political dynamics that
should inform the current debate on whether to eliminate, narrow, or clarify Chevron's
domain.

11. JUDICIAL ATTITUDES AND CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Legal scholars frequently presume that legal doctrine leads judges, despite their political ideology, to apply neutral principles to reach uniform results (the "legal model"),
but numerous empirical studies find that appellate judges' policy preferences significantly predict judicial behavior (the "attitudinal model") (e.g., Barnes Bowie & Songer
2009; Hettinger et al. 2006; Epstein et al. 2013; Sisk et al. 1998; Miles & Sunstein 2006;
Segal & Spaeth 2002). The two models can work in tandem, where doctrine limits
judges from achieving their preferred policy outcomes in some, but not all, cases
(Czarnezki 2008). The clearer (and thus more limiting) the doctrine, the more likely
that judges will comply (Staudt 2004). In other words, the truth likely rests somewhere
between the legal and attitudinal models.
After all, all legal doctrine, by identifying relevant principles and framing the points
of debate, cabins judicial discretion to some degree (Lindquist & Cross 2005). Most doctrine seeks to provide substantive principles to resolve legal issues. However, deference doctrines do something different from and in addition to substantive legal doctrine. They
command judges to defer to other actors' decisions of fact or law (such as states, agencies,
juries, or other judges) based on others' sovereign interests or institutional advantages.
Compared to other deference doctrines, Chevron deference is unique by having a
self-stated purpose of separating judges from policy preferences. When reviewing conservative or liberal agency statutory interpretations, courts are to enforce only clear congressional intent after using traditional tools of statutory construction (Step 1) and leave the
policy-making space inherent in ambiguous statutory provisions to more expert and politically accountable agencies (Step 2). By removing courts from the inherent policy making
in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions de novo, Chevron, at least in theory, renders it more likely that judicial panels of differing political and judicial ideologies across
the country will reach uniform results.
A. PriorEmpirical Work: JudicialAttitudes and Case Outcomes After Applying Chevron

Prior empirical studies have attempted to address whether, when judges apply the Chevron
deference framework, they do so uniformly to all agency interpretations or differently to
reach their presumed policy preferences. In other words, they have attempted to determine how successful Chevron is in imposing a legal model on judicial review of agency
statutory interpretation by assessing case outcomes. Indeed, despite hopes that Chevron
would separate judges from their policy preferences in making decisions, these studies
have reported evidence to the contrary. This work suggests that Chevron, once applied, is
used differently based on the ideological circumstances of the case and goals of the
reviewing judges.
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Perhaps most famously in this arena, Cross and Tiller (1998) examined approximately 170 DC Circuit Chevron cases decided between 1991 and 1995. As expected, the
authors find strong evidence of policy convergence in case outcomes applying Chevron deference. Where the panelists' partisanship aligned with the direction of the agency outcome, those judges were more likely to affirm the agency's interpretation. Later empirical
work that also considers outcomes confirms this ideological congruence effect for courts of
appeals judges' review of administrative agencies (Czarnezki 2008; Miles & Sunstein 2006;
Sunstein et al. 2004).

B. judicialAttitudes and the Threshold Chevron Question

Despite the clear interest of empirical scholars in examining the potential intersection of
judicial ideology and Chevron, prior work in this area has exclusively focused on outcomes. If judicial ideology also affects whether courts apply the Chevron deference framework at all, it is likely that we have been underestimating the political dynamics at work
in this arena of judicial decision making.
Indeed, we expect that similar attitudinal considerations will guide judicial behavior prior to a court's application of Chevron's two steps and the ultimate outcome of the
judicial review. In other words, the ideological congruence between the panel judges'
preferences and the agency's statutory interpretation should increase the likelihood that
judges will apply the Chevron framework, instead of a less deferential framework (such as
Skidmore v. Swift [1944] deference) or no deference at all.
By concentrating on the appropriate deference regime when reviewing agency statutory interpretations (as opposed to mere outcomes), judges may be best able to achieve
two goals: (1) align the outcome with their policy preferences, and (2) shroud their chosen
outcome under the cover of neutral principles of judicial review that appear independent
from the merits. For instance, under the attitudinal model, we would expect conservative
judges to apply the Chevron framework to conservative agency statutory interpretations.
Chevron deference gives agencies space to interpret ambiguous statutory provisions and
limits courts to considering whether agencies' interpretations are merely reasonable (not
correct or the best interpretation). Within this Chevron space for agencies, conservative
judges can increase the likelihood of aligning their policy preferences with the outcome of
the decision and do so within a framework that conspicuously limits the appearance of
judicial interference. Likewise, we would expect liberal judges not to apply Chevron when
reviewing conservative agency interpretations. By applying less deferential Skidmore deference or de novo review, courts proceed under a judicial review regime in which they retain

3The Supreme Court has left lower courts with some room in determining when Cheuron applies. For instance,
United States v. Mead Cmp. (2001) came close to providing a "force-of-law" rule, but it is sufficiently open-ended to
leave courts discretion. Moreover, Barnhart v. Walton (2002) relied, in dicta, on an open-ended contextual
approach and undermined even some of the certainty that many had assumed adhered in Mead (that rulemaking
and formal adjudication had the force of law and thus would always receive Chevron deference). Moreover, the new
major questions doctrine articulated in King v. Bunell (2015), with its vagaries, provides lower courts additional
room (Barnett & Walker 2017b).
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interpretive primacy to provide a definitive and best interpretation of the statutory language at issue. Within these more judicially powerful review schema, courts can justify interpreting statutes, contrary to agencies' favored readings, consistently with their preferences.
By selecting the appropriate deference regime and obscuring ideological congruence, judges can obtain the benefits that the legal model provides while limiting its costs.
The legal model has significant purchase on the legal profession. The belief that neutral
rules and precedent dictate outcomes and limit judicial discretion are central to notions
of judicial identity and judicial oversight. Relatedly, adhering to neutral rules and precedent is central to judicial reputation and can save decision-making resources (Staudt
2004). By choosing among deference regimes, judges can purport to follow neutral rules
and obscure the alignment of their policy preferences and decisions. Deference regimes,
thus, provide an avenue for judges to obtain the reputation and professional benefits of
the legal model with the personal benefits of the attitudinal model.
Although we are the first empirical study to examine judicial application of the
Chevron framework, other studies have considered judicial decision making on other
threshold questions-that is, those that do not directly concern the substantive merits of
the parties' underlying dispute. The answers to these threshold questions provide an avenue for judges to align their preferences with case outcomes. For example, prior studies
have reported that judges' political preferences have significant room to operate when
applying standing doctrine (especially if judicial oversight by higher courts is relatively
rare) (Staudt 2004; Pierce 1999; Rowland & Todd 1991) or selecting standards of review
for equal protection claims (Baldez et al. 2006).
Based on this theory and these prior studies on threshold questions, we hypothesize that reviewing appellate court panels will be ideologically minded when choosing
whether to apply the Chevron deference framework or avoid it. Stated formally:
Hypothesis la: IWn an agency interprets the relevant statute in a conservative (liberal)
direction, conservative (liberal) circuit court panels should be more likely to apply the Chevron deference framework in theirjudicial review.
Hypothesis lb: When an agency interprets the relevant statute in a liberal (conservative)
direction, conservative (liberal) circuit court panels should be less likely to apply the Chevron
deference framework in their judicial review.

111. CHEVRON WHISTLEBLOWERS?
Even if three-judge panels of all conservative or all liberal judges apply (or ignore) the Chevron
framework to further their political preferences, do mixed panels-where one judge has different political preferences than the other two-act differently? We expect that they would.
In numerous areas, researchers have reported evidence of "group polarization."
This phenomenon leads groups discussing a problem to "coalesce, not toward the middle
of antecedent dispositions, but toward a more extreme position in the direction indicated
by those dispositions" (Sunstein 2000:74-75). Prior studies have reported findings of
group polarization in the federal judiciary in a number of legal matters (Sunstein et al.
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2004), including findings that extend collegial effects beyond ideology to areas such as
the sex and race of the judges (Boyd et al. 2010; Cox & Miles 2008).
The presence of a judge with opposing political preferences on a three-judge
panel, however, leads to a "large disciplining effect" in which the majority's ruling will
align less often with its political preferences, despite the majority's ability to rule as it
pleases (Sunstein et al. 2004:306). This disciplining effect may arise from the minority
judge's counterarguments that win over her colleagues or from the minority judge's presence as a "whistleblower," who expressly or implicitly threatens to alert parties, higher
courts, and policymakers to the majority's disobedience to precedent. In reviewing the
relevant literature on these "panel effects," Stephenson (2010:308) has explained that
'judges on courts of appeals panels sometimes make concessions to their colleagues,"
including that "minority judges will sometimes go along with the majority" ("majority
effect"), and that "majority judges will sometimes make concessions to the minority judge
on the panel" perhaps to avoid a separate dissent ("diversity effect").
Cross and Tiller's (1998) study of the DC Circuit provides preliminary evidence of
a whistleblower effect in Chevron cases. As the authors find in their analysis of outcomes,
the presence of a judge of a different ideology encouraged the judges in the majority to
be more likely to defer to the agency's interpretation. Notably, these whistleblower findings are consistent with both the legal and attitudinal models. The judge of a different
ideology may affect the majority by convincing the judges to follow precedent by reasoning with them in a lawyerly fashion, thereby furthering the legal model's understanding
of how precedent and legal argument restrains judicial decision making. Or the judge
may affect the majority by threatening to call attention to the majority judges' disobedience to precedent, thereby exacting a cost under the attitudinal model for judges who,
despite precedent, would prefer to align their decisions with their preferences. Under
this latter view, the whistleblower provides a monitoring function for the en banc court
of appeals, the Supreme Court, and Congress to ensure compliance with precedent and
limit personal preferences (Staudt 2004).
Based on prior studies and their consistency with leading theoretical models, we
expect that panels with a whistleblower would be more likely to apply the Chevron deference framework than panels of ideologically homogenous judges. More formally:
Hypothesis 2: The presence of an ideological minority on a panel should increase the likelihood that a panel will apply the Chevron deferenceframework.

While whistleblowers might create a powerful pull toward Chevron in all circumstances, a more nuanced story reintroduces policy preferences into the mix. In particular,
it may be that whistleblowers have a positive effect on Chevron's application only when
the majority on the panel is not in ideological congruence with the agency's interpretation. As Cross and Tiller argue, this theory "postulates that there should be an effect
when a 2-1 majority is in conflict (in terms of its partisan policy preferences) with the
agency over policy outcomes, rather than when the 2-1 majority is in agreement with the
agency's policy choice" (1998:2171). When the majority's and the agency's preferences
conflict, the whistleblower is most likely to encourage the majority's adherence to
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doctrine (even if it renders it more likely that the agency will prevail) by either reasoning
with the majority or threatening to publicize its disobedience.
Prior whistleblowing studies confirm the ideologically-driven nature of the whistleblower effect, at least with respect to outcomes. Notably, Cross and Tiller find that in cases
where the panel is politically unified and disagrees with the agency's decision, the panel
defers to the agency only 33 percent of the time. When the panel is split 2-1, with the
majority disagreeing with the agency's decision, the rate of deference rises to 62 percent.
As the authors argue, "the presence of a whistleblower makes it almost twice as likely that
doctrine will be followed when doctrine works against the partisan policy preferences of
the court majority" (1998:2172). Miles and Sunstein (2006), studying the judicial review of
EPA and NLRB decisions, find that politically mixed panels dampen ideological effects.
Revesz's (1997) examination of the DC Circuit's review of EPA decisions reveals that panels
of three Republican-appointed judges were more likely to reach stereotypical ideological
results than panels with one or two Republican-appointed judges. Notably, Revesz did not
find a similar effect for Democrat-appointed judges. Sunstein et al. (2004) also report a
political whistleblowing effect in their study of courts of appeals cases. Like Revesz, that
effect varied depending on whether the whistleblower was a Republican or a Democrat.
With the former, a Democrat majority was 11 percent more likely to issue a conservative
ruling than an all-Democrat panel, but with the latter, a Republican majority was only 5 percent more likely to issue a liberal ruling than an all-Republican panel.
We expect a similar political congruence whistleblower effect in the context of the
decision whether to apply or avoid Chevron:
Hypothesis 3: The presence of an ideological minority on a panel should increase the likelihood that a liberal (conservative) majority panel will apply the Chevron deferenceframework
following a conservative (liberal) agency interpretation.

IV.

DATA

To examine empirically whether circuit courts apply the Chevron deference framework in
their review of agency interpretations, we utilize Barnett and Walker's (2017a) newly collected set of relevant cases decided from 2003 to 2013 in federal circuit courts. The data
include all published opinions in which the court explicitly cited and discussed Chevron
and/or Skidmore and proceeded to review an agency's interpretation of a statute.5 We

4See Barnett and Walker (2017a) for more detail on the underlying database and coding methodology. Note that
while Barnett and Walker (2017a) provide important descriptive insights into the data, they do not incorporate
political variables or estimate statistics to test hypotheses.
5

Within the 1,449 cases in our analyzed data, 1,401 cited Chevron while 48 cited only Skidmore (but not Cheuron).
Descriptively, over 25 percent of the cases in our data that cite Chevron ultimately do not use Chevron deference.

Our statistical results reported below do not substantively change when we exclude the cases citing only Skidmore
(but not Chevron) from the analysis.
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Summary Statistics for Analyzed Data
Liberal Agency Interpretation

Conservative Agency Interpretation

Mean

Stud.
Dev.

Min-Max

Mean

Stnd.
Dev.

Min-Max

Chevron deference
Panel ideology
Partisan unified panel

0.724
0.07
0.28

0.447
0.23
0.45

0 to 1
-0.42 to + 0.54
0 to 1

0.719
0.06
0.27

0.450
0.22
0.44

0 to 1
-0.50 to + 0.54
0 to 1

Panel variance

0.60

0.33

0 to 1.05

0.56

0.30

0 to 1.05

Rulemaking
Informal interpretation
Adjudication
Subject matter-environment
Subject matter-employment
Subject matter-immigration
Subject matter-entitlements
Independent
Year

0.45
0.36
0.18
0.20
0.11
0.02
0.05
0.25
5.12

0.50
0.48
0.39
0.40
0.32
0.15
0.23
0.43
3.52

0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 10

0.35
0.20
0.45
0.12
0.04
0.46
0.11
0.08
4.78

0.48
0.40
0.50
0.33
0.19
0.50
0.32
0.26
3.10

0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to 1
0 to A
0 to 1
0 to 10

exclude from our analysis 126 cases in which the agency's interpretation could not be classified as either liberal or conservative and 38 cases that were decided en banc. The resulting
6
data include 1,449 cases. Although these data allow us to speak confidently about how circuit courts apply administrative law deference doctrines, selection effects in how cases reach
appellate courts limit our ability draw broader inferences about the legal system
(e.g., Eisenberg & Heise 2015; Eisenberg & Schwab 1989; Priest & Klein 1984).
Our dependent variable is Chevron Deference. Coded dichotomously, the variable has
a value of 1 if the deciding circuit panel utilized the Chevron deference framework in its
7
review and 0 if it avoided applying Chevron and instead applied a lower level of deference
8
to the agency, including Skidmore deference or no deference at all. Summary statistics for
Chevron Deference and all other variables are reported in Table 1.
To ease the assessment of whether panels are ideologically motivated in applying
Chevron, we divide our data into two: cases in which the agency interpreted the relevant
statute in a liberal direction (Liberal Agency Interpretation) and cases in which the agency

6

For ease of reference, we refer to these as "cases," but one judicial opinion may have multiple agency statutory
interpretations under review. Each agency statutory interpretation under review is considered a separate case. To
account for the lack of independence among observations derived from a shared underlying opinion, our statistical modeling clusters the standard errors on opinions.
7

Our measurement of Chevron Deference incorporates all instances where the court utilizes the two-step Chevron deference framework in reviewing the statutory interpretation. This includes inquiries that are resolved under Chevron's
Step I and those that continue to Step 2 for their final resolution. We leave it to future work to explore the judicial
behavior and political dynamics that may be present in the application of Chevron during the two steps.
"Cases in which the circuit panel's opinion does not ultimately decide which deference standard should apply are
coded as 0. Excluding these cases (fewer than 100 total) from our analysis does not alter the key results reported
below.
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interpreted the statute in a conservative direction (Conservative Agency Interpretation).9 In
coding the ideological direction of agency interpretations, we closely follow Eskridge and
Baer (2008).10 We coded agency interpretations as liberal if the agency favored the interests of parties like civil rights plaintiffs, debtors, employees, immigrants, and taxpayers.
Agency interpretations are coded as conservative when they favor interests like alleged
discriminators in civil rights cases, employers, criminal prosecutors, companies accused
of environmental pollution, and tax collectors."' Agency interpretations that are ideologically neutral are excluded from the analysis.
Panel Ideology is necessary to assess whether panels apply the Chevron deference framework in ideologically motivated ways. To measure Panel Ideology, we utilize the Judicial Common Space (JCS) ideology scores (Epstein et al. 2007; Giles et al. 2001). Derived from the
Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE Common Space ideal point scores for senators and the
president, JCS scores range from -1 (most liberal) to + 1 (most conservative) and are
assigned to judges based on the strong norms of senatorial courtesy in the appointment
process. PanelIdeology is computed as the average JCS score of all circuit court judges sitting
in the majority in a case. Within our data, Panel Ideology ranges from -0.502 to + 0.538.
To capture the potential effects of a whistleblower, we adopt two alternative measures. The first, Partisan Unified Panel, captures whether the partisanship on the panel is
unified (coded 1) or divided (coded 0). Unified panels include all Republicans or all
Democrats, whereas divided panels include two partisan allies and one outsider (i.e., two
Republicans and one Democrat or two Democrats and one Republican). The alternative
variable for capturing the potential effect of an ideological foe on a panel is Panel Variance. This variable is calculated as the absolute distance between the most conservative
and most liberal judges on a panel and is measured using the panelists' JCS scores. The
variable ranges from 0 to 1.052 in our data, where a score of 0 means that all judges on
the panel have identical JCS scores.
In addition to these attitudinal variables, we also account for relevant agency and
case variables in our statistical modeling. This includes the agency's format or process for
engaging in statutory interpretation, which is captured via three dichotomous variables:

"Subdividing our data into liberal and conservative agency interpretations allows us to avoid the need to include
multiple double and triple interactions in our statistical modeling and eases the interpretation of the results. At
the same time, however, we recognize that the cases in these liberal and conservative agency interpretation groups
are not randomly assigned to those groups; rather, they are generated through distinct processes and case factors.
While we statistically control for some of these (e.g., subject matter, agency format), we cannot measure or observe
all the factors that lead to the different agency interpretations. As such, this article seeks to avoid directly comparing the substantive results that yield from the two datasets to one another and cautions the reader to avoid doing
so as well.
'oUnlike Baer and Eskridge (2008), we did not identify cases as "mixed" if one judicial decision upheld at least
one conservative interpretation and one liberal interpretation. For example, if a court upheld one agency liberal
interpretation and one conservative interpretation, Baer and Eskridge would code the entire decision once and
identify it as "mixed." In contrast, we coded the two separate interpretations as their own "cases," marking one as
liberal and the other as conservative.
"See the Appendix of Eskridge and Baer (2008) for full details on the coding of this variable.
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Rulemaking, Informal Interpretation, and Adjudication. An agency's format is coded as Rule-

making if it uses formal rulemaking, informal "notice and comment" rulemaking, or Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rulemaking proceedings. Agencies are
coded as using Adjudication if they rely on an adversarial hearing or adjudication. Finally,
agencies are coded as using Informal Interpretation if their statutory interpretation arises
from non-rulemaking and non-adjudication settings such as settlements, licensing or permit decisions, and agency manual or policy statements. Based on the Supreme Court's
doctrinal suggestions that the Chevron deference framework will apply to formalized
agency interpretations, we expect that courts reviewing agencies with a Rulemaking format
are more likely to use the Chevron deference framework than courts reviewing agencies
using Adjudication or Informal Interpretation. Relatedly, we also expect that courts reviewing
agencies with an Informal Interpretationformat are less likely to use the Chevron deference
framework than courts reviewing agencies using Adjudication or Rulemaking.

We also measure the subject matter of the agency interpretations. While nearly
30 different subject matters emerge from our data, a few areas dominate. These include
immigration, environment, entitlement programs, and employment. We expect that
courts would be less like to apply the Chevron framework faithfully when they review
agency statutory interpretations conceming politically salient and divisive matters, such
as employment, civil rights, and labor unions. For subject matters that have lower political salience and that rely on technical or scientific expertise, we expect that courts will
be more likely to apply the Chevron deference framework faithfully.
Additionally, we control for Independent Agency. Based on Bamett and Walker
(2017a), this variable is coded as 1 if the agency is an independent agency and 0 if it is
an executive agency. Chevron deference is grounded on, among other things, political
accountability because policy choices, made in the face of ambiguous statutory language,
are appropriately resolved by politically accountable agencies (Chevron, 467 U.S. at
865-66). By design, independent agencies are less politically accountable than executive
agencies because, among other things, the heads of independent agencies are insulated
from the oversight of the president, who is elected. We expect, accordingly, that reviewing circuit courts will be less likely to use the Chevron deference framework when reviewing independent agencies.
We also control for the circuit and year in which the cases was decided. Following
Cross and Tiller, Year is coded as 0 for the first year in our data and "is intended to capture the possibility that the Chevron doctrine has grown weaker over time" (1998:2170).

V.

RESULTS

To examine statistically when courts apply the Chevron deference framework, we estimate
logistic regression models. To ease the interpretation of our results and avoid

"We obtain statistically and substantively similar results when we estimate a linear probability model (LPM)
instead of a logistic regression model.

608

Barnett et al.

unnecessary double and triple interaction terms, we separately estimate our results for
cases with Liberal Agency Interpretationsand Conservative Agency Interpretations. Table 2 con-

tains the results.' 3
The results, reported in Table 2, allow us to assess our key attitudinal hypotheses.
We begin first with Hypothesis 1. Recall that this hypothesis anticipates that Chevron deference will be most likely during times of ideological congruence between the agency's
decision and the circuit court panel's ideological preferences. In other words, conservative panels will be more likely to apply the Chevron deference framework to the agency's
interpretation when that interpretation is itself conservative but will be less likely to utilize Chevron deference, and instead use a lower level of deference, when the agency provides a liberal interpretation, and vice versa for liberal panels.
To test this expectation, we look to the PanelIdeology variable in Table 2. We expect
to see a positive and significant effect on the Panel Ideology variable (which runs from
most liberal to most conservative) when there is a Conservative Agency Interpretationand a
negative and significant effect when there is a LiberalAgency Interpretation. As the results in
Table 2 reveal, we find partial support for this. In times of a Liberal Agency Interpretation,
Panel Ideology does not have a statistically significant effect on whether the panel uses the
Chevron deference framework or something lower. However, when there is a Conservative
Agency Interpretation, the results indicate a statistically significant effect.
Figure 1 provides more substantive insight into these Panel Ideology-Agency Interpretation direction results. Subfigure (a) confirms that when an agency has a liberal interpretation of the statute, the ideological preferences of the reviewing panel have little effect on
whether the panel will apply the Chevron framework. Indeed, after holding other variables
at their mean and modal values, the likelihood of the court affording the agency's liberal
interpretation Chevron-level deference is approximately 95 percent regardless of whether
the reviewing panel is liberal, moderate, or conservative.
When we examine the results from the conservative agency interpretation dataset
in Figure 1(b) we see a very different story. During times where the agency has issued a
conservative interpretation of the statute, conservative circuit panels continue to
apply the Chevron framework readily. As the panels move in a more liberal direction,
the likelihood of relying on the Chevron deference framework falls. As the figure indicates, the likelihood of the most liberal panel in our data using the Chevron deference framework following a conservative agency interpretation of the statute is as low
as 74 percent. By contrast, the likelihood of the most conservative panel in the data

3Using circuit court sex discrimination case data from 1995-2002, Kim (2009) provides evidence that panel effects
may emerge based on certain strategic, hierarchical considerations. Our unit of analysis (panel decision) and
dependent variable (Chevron Deference) are imperfect vehicles for fully testing Kim's strategic hierarchical theory
(which focuses on individual judge merits votes and whether judges behave counterideologically). We note as a
preliminary matter, however, that our statistical modeling reported herein is robust to the addition of strategic,
hierarchical variables Circuit En Banc Median Ideology (measured as the median ideology of the circuit's active
judges in a year) (Epstein et al. 2007) and U.S. Supreme Court Median Ideology (measured as the median ideology of
the Supreme Court in a year) (Epstein et al. 2007). The addition of these variables does not affect the statistical or
substantive effects of our main variables, nor do these variables achieve statistical significance themselves.
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Table 2: Logistic Regression Estimates for Whether the Reviewing Panel Uses the Chevron Deference Framework
Conservative Agency
Interpretation

Liberal Agency
Interpretation

Panel ideology
Partisan unified panel

Model 1(a)

Model 1(b)

Model 2(a)

Model 2(b)

0.537
(0.75)
-0.219
(0.35)

0.557
(0.69)

1.069*
(0.45)
0.207
(0.20)

1.109*
(0.45)

Panel variance
Rulemaking
Informal interpretation
Subject matter-environment
Subject matter-employment
Subject matter-immigration
Subject matter-entitlements
Independent agency
Year
Circuit controls
Constant
Observations

0.909
(0.56)
-2.100*
(0.46)
0.113
(0.41)
-0.781*
(0.39)
0.476
(0.86)
0.368
(0.57)
0.621
(0.42)
-0.068**
(0.04)
Included
2.584*
(0.68)
464

0.423
(0.53)
0.900
(0.56)
-2.120*
(0.47)
0.128
(0.41)
-0.794*
(0.39)
0.448
(0.86)
0.352
(0.57)
0.639
(0.42)
-0.071**
(0.04)
Included
2.259*
(0.71)
464

-0.180
(0.32)
0.838*
(0.30)
-2.962*
(0.36)
1.550*
(0.44)
0.200
(0.34)
-0.245
(0.35)
0.577
(0.41)
0.610
(0.43)
-0.093*
(0.03)
Included
3.170*
(0.58)
985

0.841*
(0.30)
-2.965*
(0.36)
1.551*
(0.44)
0.201
(0.34)
-0.253
(0.35)
0.566
(0.41)
0.586
(0.43)
-0.093*
(0.03)
Included
3.004*
(0.53)
985

Baseline values include Adjudication (for agency format) and Other (for subject matter). Standard errors
(reported in parentheses) are robust and clustered on the individual case. **p < 0.10; *p < 0.05.
NOTE:

using the Chevron deference
4
90 percent.'

framework

in

this

circumstance

is

as

high

as

Next, we evaluate Hypothesis 2 and the potential for whistleblower effects in
the use of the Chevron deference framework. Recall that we use two alternative measures to capture this potential effect, Partisan Unified Panel and Panel Variance. If they
behave according to the hypothesis, Partisan Unified Panel should have a negative
effect on the dependent variable (Chevron Deference) in Models la and 2a, and Panel
Variance should have a positive effect in Models lb and 2b. As the results in Table 2

14One might believe that circuitjudges first decide the outcome of the case before deciding on the content of the

opinion and whether to apply Chevron or a lower deference standard. To account for this possibility, we estimate
an alternative specification of Models ]a and 2a with the inclusion of an additional case outcome independent variable. Doing so does not alter the substance of the key results reported in the text.
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Figure 1: Predicted probability that a circuit court panel will use the Chevron deference
framework based on the panel majority's ideology.
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indicate, neither Partisan Unified Panel nor Panel Variance has a statistically significant
effect on the likelihood of the panel using the Chevron deference framework in any of
the models.
To examine Hypothesis 3, we take a further step in our statistical analysis to assess
if a whistleblower effect emerges when a 2-1 panel majority is in ideological conflict with
the agency's interpretation. To do this, we reestimate Models 1 and 2 with the additional
inclusion of an interaction term. By interacting Panel Ideology & Partisan Unified Panel
(as well as Panel Ideolog & Panel Variance), we can more precisely assess the circumstances
where two members of the panel are likely to be in ideological opposition with the
agency's statutory interpretation but the third minority member of the panel may act to
effectively force the panel to use the Chevron deference framework anyway. The results
are reported in Table 3.
Since interactive terms are difficult to interpret substantively, we look to Figure 2's
graphical depiction of the interactive effect of PanelIdeolog with the panel's partisan and
ideological homogeneity. The results provide no evidence to support Hypothesis 3 for
either the liberal or the conservative agency interpretation subsets of data. First, looking
to subfigures (a) and (b) focused on divided versus unified partisan panels, Hypothesis 3
(a) would anticipate that during times of a liberal agency interpretation, conservative
panels composed 3-0 of Republican judges would be less likely to use the Chevron deference framework than panels composed of two Republican judges and one Democrat
judge. As subfigure (a)'s right side makes clear, divided and unified conservative panels
are indistinguishable in their Chevron behavior. Similarly, for conservative agency interpretations, Hypothesis 3 and Partisan Unified Panel expect 3-0 Democrat judge panels to
have more freedom to not use the Chevron deference framework than 2-1 Democrat
judge panels. Subfigure (c) does see the divided and unified panel lines diverging from
one another as the panel ideology becomes more liberal, but that divergence is in the
opposite direction as expected. Additionally, large confidence intervals indicate that any
differences between the estimates for divided and unified panels are not statistically significant. The story is nearly identical for Hypothesis 3, Panel Variance, and subfigures
(b) and (d): there is no difference between conservative, ideologically homogenous and
heterogeneous panels in the face of a liberal agency interpretation and the downward
trend for liberal panels during times of conservative agency interpretations is in the
opposition direction of what would be expected.
We turn briefly to the control variables in our models. Returning to the estimations
from Models la and 2a, we see that the agency's format or process for engaging in statutory interpretation does, at times, have an effect on whether the Chevron deference framework is provided. Informal Interpretationis statistically significant and negative (relative to
the baseline of Adjudication) in Models la and 2a, and Rulemaking is significant and positive in Model 2a.
The substantive effects of these comparative agency formats are plotted in
Figure 3. During times of a liberal agency interpretation (depicted in the top portion
of the figure), panels are about 41 percent more likely to use the Chevron deference
framework when the agency uses rulemaking than when it uses a type of informal interpretation. Similarly, panels are approximately 36 percent more likely to use the Chevron
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Logistic Regression Estimates for Whether the Reviewing Panel Uses the Chevron Deference Framework, with Interaction Terms

Table 3:

Liberal Agency
Interpretation

Panel ideology
Partisan unified panel
Panel ideology x Partisan unified panel

Model 3(a)

Model 3(b)

Model 4(a)

Model 4(b)

-0.210
(1.08)
-0.333
(0.36)
1.186
(1.34)

0.843
(0.99)

1.446**

0.908
(0.60)

Panel variance
Panel ideology x Panel variance
Rulemaking
Infonnal interpretation

0.920
(0.56)

-2.109*
(0.46)

Subject matter-environment

0.087
(0.42)

Subject matter-employment

-0.793*

Subject matter-immigration

(0.40)
0.462

(0.86)
Subject matter-entitlements

0.416

(0.57)
Independent agency
Year
Circuit controls
Constant
Observations

Conservative Agency
Interpretation

0.626
(0.42)
-0.070**
(0.04)
Included
2.621*
(0.68)
464

(0.75)
0.225
(0.20)

-0.569
(0.85)
0.517
(0.56)
-0.790
(1.98)
0.900
(0.56)
-2.125*
(0.46)
0.123
(0.41)
-0.793*
(0.39)
0.435
(0.86)
0.370
(0.57)
0.646
(0.42)
-0.073**
(0.04)
Included
2.199*
(0.71)
464

-0.206
(0.32)

0.628
(1.32)

0.840*
(0.30)
-2.972*
(0.36)
1.546*
(0.44)

0.202
(0.34)

-0.257
(0.35)

0.568
(0.41)

0.595
(0.43)

-0.094*
(0.03)
Included
2.994*
(0.53)
985

0.837*
(0.30)
-2.969*
(0.36)
1.549*
(0.44)
0.206
(0.34)
-0.246
(0.35)
0.584
(0.41)
0.615
(0.43)
-0.094*
(0.03)
Included
3.178*
(0.58)
985

NoTE: Baseline values include Adjudication (for agency format) and Other (for subject matter). Standard errors
(reported in parentheses) are robust and clustered on the individual case. **p < 0.10; *p < 0.05.

deference framework when the agency uses adjudication than when it relies on informal interpretation. For times where there is a conservative agency interpretation (bottom portion of the figure), the differences are even more notable. Holding all else
equal, panels are estimated to be 59 percent more likely to use the Chevron deference
framework when the agency uses adjudications than when it relies on informal interpretation. These panels are about 73 percent more likely to use the Chevron deference
framework when the agency uses rulemaking than when it uses a type of informal interpretation and 15 percent more likely when the agency uses rulemaking instead of
adjudication.
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Figure 2: Predicted probability that a circuit court panel will use the Chevron deference
framework based on the panel majority's ideology and the presence of a partisan or ideological whistleblower.
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The subject matter of the agency interpretation occasionally matters in the likelihood of Chevron being applied. While Model la indicates that employment-related cases
have a negative effect compared to other subject areas during times when the agency has
a liberal interpretation, this difference is not substantively significant. Under Model 2a
(conservative interpretations only), panels are approximately 16 percent more likely to
use the Chevron deference framework in environmental cases than immigration cases and
12 percent more likely to do so in environmental cases than all other subject areas not
listed.
Models la and 2a indicate that reviewing panels do not differentially apply Chevron
to Independent Agencies than to executive agencies. However, the Year variable shows a negative and significant effect for both Models la and 2a, indicating that Chevron is less likely
to be applied as time marches on in our data (from 2003 to 2013).
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Figure 3: Change in the predicted probability that a reviewing court will use the Chevron
deference framework based on different agency formats.
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VI.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In light of the recent and growing conservative calls to abandon or at least narrow Chevron
deference, our findings are particularly noteworthy. As we reveal, liberal and conservative
judges, on average, apply Chevron at effectively the same high rate for liberal agency interpretations. However, when it comes to conservative agency interpretations, we find that liberal judges are less likely to apply the Chevron framework (and more likely to use a less
deferential review standard) than their conservative judge counterparts-by as much as
16 percent less so than conservative judges. This finding is particularly striking as Chevron
itself was the product of the Reagan Administration-a doctrine that shifted power from a
liberal DC Circuit to a more conservative presidential administration.
Viewed together, our results perhaps provide additional support for conservatives'
calls to revisit Chevron deference-whether its existence altogether or how to ascertain
when the doctrine applies. For instance, in Michigan v. EPA (2015), Justice Thomas has
expressed constitutional concerns about Chevron deference, both under Article III of the
Constitution because the doctrine displaces the court's duty to say what the law is and
under Article I by facilitating excessively broad congressional delegations of law-making
authority to federal agencies. Now-Justice Gorsuch expressed similar constitutional
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concerns during his time as a circuit court judge: "[T] he fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative
power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to
square with the Constitution of the framers' design. Maybe the time has come to face the
behemoth" (Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch [10th Cir. 2016] [Gorsuch, J., concurring], at
1149). This judicial criticism, coupled with the growing scholarly criticism of Chevron deference, no doubt played a substantial role in Republicans introducing legislation to eliminate Chevron deference (Walker 2016a).
Other conservatives have stopped short of calling for Chevron's demise and, instead,
advocated for its narrowing. ChiefJustice Roberts appears to be leading the charge for such
narrowing, writing for the Court in King v. Burwell that Chevron deference should not apply
to "question [s] of deep 'economic and political significance'" and perhaps when the implementing agency "has no expertise in crafting [] policy of this sort" (2015:2489). Indeed, in
his dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC, the Chief Justice advocated for a more-searching,
context-specific Chevron deference, arguing that "[a]n agency interpretation warrants such
deference only if Congress has delegated authority to definitively interpret a particular ambiguity in a particular manner" (2013:1883). Such a context-specific narrowing of Chevron deference is much more likely to occur than its outright elimination (Walker 2016b).
If this turns out to be true and courts are given greater discretion to avoid applying
the Chevron deference framework, the findings of this article take on even greater significance. Notably, with a more nuanced threshold inquiry comes a more open-ended,
standards-based inquiry that provides courts additional discretion in deciding whether to
apply the framework, even if it better captures congressional preferences as to delegated
interpretive authority. That discretion would likely only exacerbate the differences that
we find between conservative and liberal judges as to conservative interpretations and further frustrate the framework's purpose of removing judges from politically charged interpretations. Instead, a stronger rule-based framework (such as those proposed by Justice
Scalia in his dissent in United States v. Mead Corp. (2001) and now-Judge David Barron and
now-Justice Elena Kagan (Barron & Kagan 2001) would better ensure that courts apply
the Chevron framework consistently.
With Republican control of the White House (and the Senate), however, an argument could be made that it is better from conservatives' viewpoint to preserve Chevron
deference. As a preliminary matter, Chevron deference in theory provides space for
agency deregulatory efforts of a conservative nature. Indeed, the Chevron decision itself
resulted in the Supreme Court deferring to a Reagan Administration's deregulatory effort
in the environmental context. Our findings as to liberal judges and conservative agency
interpretations, however, suggest that such conservative deregulatory efforts might not
fare as well today, especially in a federal judiciary that has become more liberal from
eight years ofjudicial appointments by a Democratic president.
Contrary to some evidence in prior studies, we find no evidence of "whistleblower"
or disciplining effects when judges of different judicial ideologies comprised the panel.
Because we focus on the choice of the doctrine rather than the case outcome, this makes our
test not precisely analogous to other studies in this area. At the same time, prior empirical
findings of whistleblower effects were lukewarm at best, often hampered by data limitations at
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the time (e.g., Cross & Tiller 1998). Additionally, there may be reason to believe that Chevronrelated whistleblowing effects are time bound. Recall that whistleblower evidence was based
on earlier time periods (in the case of Cross and Tiller, 1991-1995). By contrast, this project's
study focuses on more recent cases (2003-2013), all of which were decided following the
Supreme Court's 2001 decision in United States v. Mead Corporationthat clarified the continued
validity of Skidmore. As a result of this renewed flexibility in the modem era, there may be less
need for doctrine-based whistleblowing than was previously the case. No matter the interpretation here, it is critical that scholars continue to test for whistleblowing effects across judicial
decision-making settings, subject areas, courts, and time.
We do not mean to overstate these implications from our findings. After all, liberal
judges still apply the Chevron deference framework to conservative agency statutory interpretations at a somewhat high rate. Conservative agency statutory interpretations, including deregulatory efforts, could fare worse in court without Chevron deference. Although
our data include every published circuit court decision that cites Chevron or Skidmore during the 11-year time period, it does not include every circuit court review of an agency
statutory interpretation during the timeframe. In particular, we do not examine unpublished decisions, nor do we evaluate judicial opinions that did not cite Chevron or Skidmore. Although we think it unlikely that judges act strategically in refusing to publish a
5
decision or refusing to cite Chevron and Skidmore, it is a remote possibility.
More importantly, this article does not assess whether and under which circumstances agencies ultimately prevail in court, only whether and under which circumstances
circuit courts apply the Chevron framework. This threshold question nevertheless has
important implications for agency outcomes in court because agency interpretations are
as much as 25 percentage points more likely to prevail under Chevron deference than
Skidmore deference or de novo review (Barnett & Walker 2017a). A court's decision
whether to apply the Chevron framework also has important implications for the future
development of the law. Refusal to apply the Chevron framework, in many cases, means
that the court-and not the agency-is the primary, authoritative interpreter of the statutory ambiguity and, thus, the agency does not have subsequent authority to provide a different interpretation under the Supreme Court's decision in National Cable and
.

Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services (2005)

Our results in this arena have important implications for all of the preexisting studies examining and often finding that Chevron's two steps are applied in ideological ways.

'uAs discussed in note 5, our statistical results do not substantively change when we exclude the cases citing only

Skidmore (but not Chevron) from the analysis, which provides some further support for our intuitions that courts do
not strategically refuse to cite Chevron when they want to depart from its use. While prior research finds some evidence that appellate judges are strategic in their publication decisions (e.g., Vladeck & Gulati 2005; Law 2005;
Nielson & Walker 2016), we expect that this type of strategy is much more likely to be linked to case outcomes and
merits than threshold decisions.
'To be sure, sometimes a court refuses to apply Chevron deference because the agency has not utilized formal procedures, thus allowing the agency to resume its primary interpretive role by using more formalized proceedings
subsequent to thejudicial interpretation of the statutory ambiguity.
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By finding that there are also ideological effects pior to the outcome-vis--vis whether to
apply the Chevron deference framework at all or, instead apply Skidmore-level or no
deference-our results confirm that prior case-outcome-focused empirical studies almost
certainly undersell the ideological component of Chevron deference.
Our focus on the invocation of the Chevron deference framework also sheds important empirical light on the role of legal doctrine in cabining judicial discretion. The
resulting story is a mixed one. Liberal judges' ideological preferences appear to affect
their application of the Chevron deference framework, but this appears to be less true for
conservative judges. As a result, our findings do not provide clear vindication for either
the legal or attitudinal model as to when circuit courts invoke the Chevron framework.
Viewed together, our findings underscore an earlier conclusion that "[1]egal analysis, as a
distinct method of human reasoning, cannot be reduced to any methodology borrowed
from another discipline. The judge brings to bear 'not only a range of personal and political preferences, but also a specialized cultural competence-his knowledge of and experience in 'the law"' (Sisk et al. 1998:1500).
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